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Abstract 
The paper considers an industry featuring agency problems between outside investors 
and entrepreneurs who manage the firms comprising the industry. In a range of 
circumstances, industry scale is independent of product market structure, and is 
determined solely by the amount of  equity financing contributed by the 
entrepreneurs, and by the capital market’s response to possible managerial 
malfeasance.  Thus, in the face of capital market constraints, a change in product-
market concentration has no effect on market performance unless it occasions a 
change in the amount of inside equity financing.
                                                 
*  We thank Judy Chevalier, Matt Rhodes-Kropf , seminar participants at Columbia Business School and 
the University of California at Berkeley, and participants at the 2003 NBER Corporate Finance Summer 
Institute for helpful comments on earlier versions. 
 1. Introduction 
 
 In their seminal article on the theory of the firm, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
recognized that the managers who control a firm can chose between consuming 
perquisites (“non-pecuniary benefits”) and maximizing the value of the firm, and that the 
agency costs of outside financing are determined jointly with the scale of the firm.    We 
build on these important observations to show how credit market constraints limit the 
scale of an industry. 
 Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) analysis was at the level of the firm, not the 
industry.  They showed how the agency costs of outside equity reduced the optimal scale 
of a firm.  In contrast, we consider the interaction of capital and product market 
competition, focusing on how default risk associated with managerial spending on 
perquisites causes the credit market to ration firms participating in the same product 
market.    To be sure, Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 333-343) did recognize certain 
costs of debt, but this was mainly to explain why outside financing does not consist 
entirely of debt.  In contrast, the main idea underlying our analysis is that managerial 
spending on perquisites is potentially a source of default risk. 
 Our model of capital market and product market competition between 
entrepreneurial firms yields an invariance result.  Production by these firms is financed 
by inside equity and debt.  In a range of circumstances, industry scale is independent of 
the number of competitors, and is determined solely by the capital market’s response to 
possible managerial malfeasance and the amount of inside equity contributed by the 
                                                 
1 Williams (1995) is similar in spirit.  In Williams' model, the capital market constraints that control 
managerial spending on perquistites distort an industry's choice of technology.  In equilibrium, more firms 
adopt a high marginal cost technology, resulting in a smaller industry scale. 
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entrepreneurs who manage the firms.  An additional competitor expands the market only 
to the extent the entrepreneur who manages the new firm brings additional equity to the 
industry.  Thus, the degree of competition has a neutral effect on market performance, 
unless the total amount of inside equity changes with the number of competitors in the 
product market. 
The idea that product market competition varies with the financial conditions of 
firms has been demonstrated for a number of industries, including supermarkets 
(Chevalier 1995a, 1995b; Chevalier and Scharfstein 1995, 1996) and airlines (Busse 
2002).  A leading theoretical explanation is the “limited liability effect” of capital 
structure commitments on the equilibrium price and quantity strategies of firms (Brander 
and Lewis 1986; Maksimovic 1988; Showalter 1995, 1996).  An alternative possible 
explanation is that the capital market controls managerial misappropriation by rationing 
funds needed to finance production (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Bolton and Scharfstein 
1990; and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2002).  Our contribution is to develop the latter 
argument at the level of the industry rather than just at the level of the individual firm.  
We show that the equilibrium scale of an entrepreneurial industry depends on the extent 
of its reliance on outside funds to finance production, and that the market share of an 
individual firm depends both on its own financial condition and that of its rivals.  Thus an 
industry’s equilibrium competition in the product market is intertwined with its 
competition in capital markets.1  We remark further on the relationship between our 
theory and the received empirical and theoretical literatures as we go along. 
 Our approach departs from the conventional corporate finance wisdom that 
product market competition disciplines firms and their managers.  The informal 
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justification for this view is that competition fosters a form of natural selection that weeds 
out incompetent, dishonest and imprudent managerial teams.  Hart (1983) argues more 
formally that competition reduces agency problems between managers and owners by 
revealing more information, but this result is sensitive to assumptions about the 
manager’s utility function (Scharfstein (1988)). Hermalin (1992) and Schmidt (1997) also 
argue that the effect of competition on managerial incentives is ambiguous. Raith (2002) 
develops a model in which shareholders provide managers with stronger incentives to 
reduce costs when competition increases.  Allen and Gale (2000) abstract from agency 
problems, and argue that competition is more effective than standard corporate 
government mechanisms at selecting more productive managerial teams.  Our invariance 
result is in stark contrast to these ideas, although admittedly we restrict our attention to 
entrepreneurial firms.2  The invariance result of course also departs from the conventional 
industrial organization wisdom.   
 The rest of our paper is organized as follows.  The next section lays out our basic 
assumptions about the structure of the product market and the capital market, and 
establishes the optimality of simple debt contracts.  Section 3 considers a monopoly 
market structure, and shows how agency considerations cause the credit market to 
constrain the scale of the firm below the neoclassical monopoly level.  This section also 
further discusses the relationship between our analysis and that of Jensen and Meckling 
(1986).  Section 4 generalizes the monopoly result to symmetric oligopoly, demonstrating 
                                                 
2 Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 329) similarly distance their analysis from the then prevailing versions of 
this conventional wisdom:  “It is frequently argued that the existence of competition in product (and factor) 
markets will constrain the behavior of managers to ideal value maximization, i.e., that monopoly in product 
(or monopsony in factor) markets will permit larger divergences from value maximization.  Our analysis 
does not support this hypothesis.  The owners of a firm with monopoly power have the same incentives to 
limit divergences of the manager from value maximization. (i.e. the ability to increase their wealth) as do 
the owners of competitive firms.” 
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how the capital market constrains the scale of the industry.  This section derives our basic 
invariance result:  when capital market constraints are binding, equilibrium depends on 
the total amount of industry inside equity, and not on the number of symmetric 
competitors per se.  The section also contrasts our analysis with Brander and Lewis 
(1986).  Section 5 extends the analysis to the case of asymmetric inside equity, and shows 
that equilibrium industry scale depends on the total inside equity of credit-constrained 
firms and the number of unconstrained firms.  This section also relates our results to 
some of the empirical literature on capital structure and product market competition.  
Section 6 draws some policy conclusions.  All proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
 
2. Basic Economic Environment 
 
 Consider an economy in which only n entrepreneurs can sell a unique product, 
either because they each have a well-defined property right over the relevant production 
technologies, or because only they have the required managerial talent to run the 
production processes.3  The market has the following structure.  The production 
technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, and the average cost of production is equal 
to c.  Inputs must be purchased in advance of production, and the opportunity cost of a 
unit of financial capital is ( )1 r+ .  Revenue is a function of the quantity of output, 
( ) ( )R Q P Q Q= , where ( )P Q  is the (inverse) demand curve.  The demand curve is 
downward sloping and continuous, as is the corresponding marginal revenue curve.  
Moreover, (0) 0R =  and '(0) (1 )R r c> + . 
                                                 
3  For example, FCC licensing of spectrum rights limits the number of competitors in markets for wireless 
telephony. 
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 We are interested in exploring how the credit market might constrain the product 
market outcome.  Toward this end we assume that the entrepreneur is endowed with a 
limited amount of financial capital, ie  and denote the total amount of “inside” capital in 







=∑ .  The entrepreneurs invest these amounts in their respective 
enterprises, but must raise additional funds on the capital market in order to expand 
industry production beyond E
c
.  In order to produce quantity ii
eq
c
> , an entrepreneur 
must raise a sufficient amount of financial capital, i i ik cq e≥ − , from outside investors.  
The capital market is perfectly competitive, and outside investors are willing to lend 
funds at an interest rate of r when there is no default risk.  Loans are repaid at the end of 
the period. 
 The agency problem for outside investors is that each entrepreneur has the ability 
to divert funds to non-productive managerial perquisites.  More precisely, the 
entrepreneur can spend each dollar of financial capital either on production or on 
perquisites with a monetary-equivalent value of λ  (measured at the end of the period).  
λ  is commonly known to all agents. In addition, we assume that 0 1 rλ< < + , which 
means that it would be inefficient for outside investors to fund managerial perquisites.  
The problem facing investors is that managerial spending on perquisites is not verifiable, 
and cannot be recovered if the entrepreneur/manager defaults on the loan and enters 
bankruptcy.4  Therefore, investors are concerned about expropriation by managerial 
malfeasance. 
                                                 
4  Default and bankruptcy are synonymous in our model.  The important idea is that bankruptcy effectively 
shields entrepreneurs from the claims of lenders.  In our simple model, there are no assets to liquidate in 
bankruptcy, so default means simply that creditors are not repaid. 
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=∑ ) that augments the entrepreneurs’ initial investment of equity 
(E). At stage 2, the entrepreneurs allocate available financial capital between productive 
inputs and managerial perquisites; any remaining funds are kept as reserves and invested 
at the prevailing rate r. Capital markets have rational expectations and at stage 1, supply 
funds up to the point of zero expected profits given rational expectations about the 
entrepreneurs’ (monetary-equivalent) utility-maximizing decisions at stage 2.  These two 
conditions, utility-maximizing production and the capital-market competition, define 
industry equilibrium. 
 We emphasize our twin assumptions that, while production decisions and the 
related expenditures are not contractible, their outcomes are; that is revenues from 
production (and cash reserves) are verifiable and contractible. These assumptions capture 
the stylized facts that production decisions are a managerial prerogative precisely because 
these decisions are complex and require expertise. Managers can take advantage of the 
opacity of the firm’s operations to outsiders and of the discretion that they enjoy over the 
use of the firm’s resources to divert these resources instead of using them for productive 
purposes.5 Thus managerial “stealing” is the process of transforming financial capital into 
private benefits or assets that cannot be verified or recovered by investors and courts. 
Because managers have limited liability and cannot be punished beyond the verifiable 
amount of the firm’s income, this creates a moral hazard problem. When managers 
actually engage in production and do not steal, however, the resulting income can be 
                                                 
5 In practice some operating expenditures are verifiable and most firms invest in plants and other assets that 
are sometimes used as collateral. However, as long as the operations of the firm require substantial 
investments in other assets that can be transferred (e.g. working capital) or are intangible (e.g. R&D), the 
qualitative results of the model will hold. 
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verified and recovered by debt-holders (as in Townsend (1979)). This is consistent with 
the fact that legal claims against sales receipts are usually enforceable in bankruptcy.   
There is no role for outside equity in our model.  The substitution of outside 
equity for debt would only increase an entrepreneur’s incentive to divert capital spending 
to perquisites.6  Thus, the “capital market” is synonymous with the “credit market”, and 
we restrict our attention to debt contracts as means of outside finance. A proof that this 
restriction does not entail any loss of generality is presented in the Appendix. 
 




The monopoly case (n=1) provides initial insights into how the capital market 
constrains production decisions. Neoclassical monopoly profit is given by  
 ( ) ( ) (1 )W Q P Q Q r cQ= − +  
Our assumptions imply that the neoclassical monopoly output, QM, is positive and 
satisfies the first-order condition for profit-maximization, '( ) (1 )MR Q r c= + . We want to 
explore how the credit market might reduce equilibrium output below the monopoly 
level.  Toward this end we assume that the entrepreneur is endowed with a limited 
amount of financial capital, ME cQ< . 
 Figure 1 illustrates the industry equilibrium for the case in which the capital 
market constrains output below the neoclassical monopoly level.   The concave curve is 
                                                 
6  Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 330-343) recognize this point, and get around it by introducing 
additional agency costs of debt.  We ignored these additional considerations in order to simplify and focus 
on our main idea that capital markets deal with agency costs by constraining industry size. 
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the neoclssical monopoly profit and the upward sloping line is the maximum net benefit 
from diverting financial capital from production to perquisites.  The equilibrium output is 
Qˆ , which is less than the neoclassical monopoly output MQ .  The crucial feature of this 
construction is that the two curves intersect at Qˆ , indicating that, in the equilibrium, the 
entrepreneur is just indifferent between production and perquisites.  If the capital market 
were to lend additional funds, then, as we show below, the entrepreneur would have an 
incentive to spend everything on perquisites and default on the debt. 
 Figure 1 also makes clear that our results do not depend crucially on the linearity 
of the stealing technology. As long as the curve representing the benefits of stealing is not 
too concave and cuts the neoclassical profit curve from below, our conclusions are 
unaffected. 
We now analyze the industry equilibrium more carefully.  We begin by analyzing 
the entrepreneur’s production decision given financial resources ( )K E+ , where K is 
debt and E is inside equity.  The entrepreneur can invest some of its financial capital cQ  
in production to generate end of period revenues ( )R Q , save an amount I as reserve and 
earn (1 )I r+ and squander the rest of the funds on perquisites and obtain a private benefit 
equal to ( )E K cQ Iλ + − − .  Any claims are paid out of revenues and reserves since 
spending on perquisites cannot be recovered in bankruptcy. Therefore, the entrepreneur’s 
choice problem is:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
,
, , (1 ) 1 ( )
Q I
Max Q E K P Q Q r I r K E K cQ Iπ λ+= + + − + + + − −    
 subject to     I cQ E K+ ≤ +          0I ≥        0Q ≥  
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In the statement of this problem, the notation [ ] { }max ,0X X+   recognizes the limited 
liability of the entrepreneur. 
Two observations shed light on how the solution of this problem departs from the 
standard marginal analysis. First, it is never optimal for the entrepreneur to choose 
positive levels of production and reserves that are insufficient to pay the debt fully. The 
reason for this is that the entrepreneur is always better off “stealing” these funds (i.e. 
diverting these funds to perquisites). Second, it is never optimal for the entrepreneur to 
steal some funds while producing and saving enough to repay the debt in full. The 
intuition for this is that the entrepreneur is in effect stealing from himself when debt is 
repaid in full. Since stealing is inefficient, this behavior is suboptimal. These two facts 
imply that stealing is an all or nothing proposition for the entrepreneur, and that, in 
equilibrium, stealing cannot coexist with strictly positive output.7 
Thus the entrepreneur makes a binary decision between investing in perquisites 
and investing in production.8 The entrepreneur elects to spend financial capital on 




< ≤ .  These expressions combine to imply the following incentive-
compatibility constraint 
                                                 
7 Another way to understand the entrepreneur’s decision is to recognize the option-like structure of her 
levered equity. The entrepreneur must choose between “legitimate” compensation through productive 
behavior and “illegitimate” gains through stealing. However, the legitimate rewards are obtained only if the 
debt is repaid in full. Once debt is repaid, all the surplus goes to the entrepreneur. Therefore conditional on 
repaying the debt, the entrepreneur will always behave efficiently and avoid stealing; her option is “in the 
money”. However, when debt is expected not to be repaid in full (the option is out of the money), the 
entrepreneur cannot get any legitimate rewards and so her best strategy is to get the maximum illegitimate 
rewards and steal everything. 
8 This is due to the assumption that stealing is inefficient. Relaxing this assumption would not change the 
flavor of our results. More on this below. 
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( ) ( ) (1 )W Q E K r Eλ≥ + − +    for 0 E KQ
c
+
< ≤ . 
The left-hand side of the inequality is the total production surplus available to the 
entrepreneur.  The right-hand side is the premium the entrepreneur obtains from the 
monetary-equivalent value of perquisites.  Thus, this is a “no-stealing constraint”; the 
entrepreneur has no incentive to divert working capital to perquisites.  
The monopolist never produces more than MQ  because beyond the neoclassical 
monopoly output the marginal revenue of an additional dollar invested in production is 
lower than (1+r) and this is always dominated by saving when output is positive (and 
debt is fully repaid). Also, if ME K cQ+ < , and the entrepreneur produces at all, then she 
invests all her capital in production; that is, the entrepreneur never chooses a quantity 
0 max , ME KQ Q
c
+ 
< <  
 
. The reason for this is that, because quantity is positive, there 
is no stealing, and any amount not used in production is saved as reserve; however, the 
reserve only generates (1+r) when production an extra dollar invested in production 
generates ( ) (1 )R Q r
c
′
> + . In other words, the firm produces 





, if this value satisfies the above incentive-compatibility 
constraint, and produces 0Q =  otherwise. 
 The capital market anticipates the behavior of the entrepreneur and will provide 
funds up to Kˆ  satisfying  
 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )( ) 1E K E KP r E K r E
c c




Any outside investment beyond Kˆ  would lead to bankruptcy, depriving outside investors 
of any repayment of principal and interest.  
We are now in a position to characterize the industry equilibrium.  Define Qˆ  as 
the strictly positive root of  





=  is the maximum industry scale that the capital market is willing 
to finance.  If ˆ MQ Q≥ , then the capital market stands ready to fund all that is required by 
a monopolist, and exerts no constraint on industry scale.  Otherwise, the capital market 
constrains the firm from producing the neoclassical monopoly output. Given that 
investors can save on their own at rate r, we can without loss of generality restrict 
attention to equilibria in which entrepreneurs raise exactly the amount that the market 
expects them to spend on production. 
 
Proposition 1.  A monopolist produces { }ˆmin , MQ Q Q= , financed by 
inside equity E and loans K cQ E= − . The constrained output Qˆ  is 
increasing in E and decreasing in λ . 
 
It is noteworthy that more effective corporate governance, represented by a 
reduction in λ , might increase the output and lower the price of the product.  A lower 
value of λ  increases the debt ceiling that the capital market imposes on the firm.  
Therefore, if agency considerations constrain the size of the firm, then it follows that 
better corporate governance expands output.  In this case, an improvement in corporate 
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governance, that lessens a manager’s ability to benefit from wasteful non-pecuniary 
consumption, improves social welfare. 
It is also noteworthy that an increase in the amount of equity capital supplied by 
entrepreneur might expand output.  The fact that Qˆ  is increasing in E means that the 
capital market is willing to fund a larger scale of production if the entrepreneur/manager 
has a greater amount of equity capital at stake.9   
The fact that there is never any stealing in equilibrium is a direct consequence of 
the assumption that stealing is inefficient, i.e. 1 rλ < + .  Relaxing this assumption would 
not change the flavor of the proposition but would generate equilibrium stealing as is 
illustrated in the Appendix.  However, this assumption is useful because it allows us to 
focus on the product-market effects of credit-market constraints, rather than on the 
amount of equilibrium stealing.  The latter element is, in our view, the more obvious but 
less important manifestation of agency costs.  
We illustrate the proposition with the simple example of a linear inverse demand 
function of the form ( )P Q A Q= − . It is straightforward to verify that the monopoly 
output is given by (1 )
2
M A r cQ − += . The parametric restriction ( )1A r c≥ +  is necessary 
for production to occur ever. The minimum level of inside equity ME that can support the 
monopoly output is given by replacing Qˆ  by the value for MQ  in (1.1)  
( ) ( )1 2 1
4(1 )
M A r c A r cE
r




                                                 
9 Whether or not the amount of industry debt ( Qˆ E− ) increases with E is ambiguous. 
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If parameters are such that ( )1 2A r cλ≥ + + , then 0ME = , and the monopoly output 
obtains even when the entrepreneur is penniless. The resulting equilibrium can be written 
as: 









A r cQ if E E
Q





= − + + + − + + + + <

. 
Note also that when capital market imperfections constrain output below the monopoly 
level, that is, when ME E<  (or equivalently when ˆ MQ Q< ), the equilibrium output 
increases with the amount of inside equity. 
Inside equity capital is also important for understanding industry growth in a 
dynamic monopoly model.  In the Appendix we add an additional production period to 
the monopoly model, and show that this relaxes the capital market incentive 
compatibility constraint.  The option to produce and earn a monopoly rent in the second 
period effectively reduces the entrepreneur’s incentive to steal in the first period, 
assuming that the entrepreneur losses her property right in the event of bankruptcy.  
Moreover, retained profits from the first period contribute inside equity capital in the 
second period.   The spirit of our two-period analysis is similar to Albuquerque and 
Hopenhayn (2002) who consider a richer dynamic model of a credit-constrained 
entrepreneurial firm.10 
A discussion of the relationship between this analysis and the one in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) also is presented in the Appendix. The main differences are that our 
                                                 
10 The Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002) model features an infinite horizon, demand uncertainty, and a 
more general “stealing” technology.  The optimal debt contract does not have a simple structure; indeed, 
once the firm grows to optimal size, the entrepreneur is paid a fixed dividend and the “lender” becomes a 
residual claimant.  Before this point, however, the entrepreneur receives nothing, i.e. all accumulated 
“inside equity” is reinvested in the firm, as in our model.  
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model (i) assumes that perquisites are inefficient, and (ii) allows for the possibility of 
default (and bankruptcy) caused by managerial spending on perquisites.  We have shown 
that, if the capital market were to provide enough financial capital to achieve a monopoly 
scale, then the entrepreneur who manages the firm might choose to spend these resources 
on perquisites, produce nothing, and declare bankruptcy.  This case occurs when 
monopoly rents are small relative to the value of perquisites.  In this case, the capital 
market responds by reducing the amount of financial capital available to the firm, thus 
reducing scale below the monopoly level. 
 
4. Symmetric Oligopoly 
 
We now consider competition between n ≥ 2 symmetric firms who compete in the 
product market and also compete for funds in the capital market.  Barriers to entry into 
the product market are absolute.   
The product market has the same structure as before except for the number of 
market participants.  The market demand curve and marginal revenue curve are 
downward sloping and continuous, and all firms possess the same constant returns 
production technology.  Inputs are purchased in advance of production, and the capital 
market is competitive.   
The symmetric Cournot equilibrium is a benchmark.  This Cournot solution has 
an industry output n nQ nq=  satisfying  
 ( ) ( )' 1n n nP Q q P Q r+ = + .  
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nQ  is non-decreasing in n. A sufficient condition for a unique and symetric Cournot 
equilibrium is that P(Q) is log-concave (Amir and Lambson, 2000). Let ( )C iq Q−  
represent the Cournot best response function for a representative firm (Firm i) when 
competitors produce Q-i. 
We consider how agency problems can result in an industry scale below the 
Cournot level.  Toward this end, we assume that each firm is owned and managed by an 
entrepreneur with limited equity capital, and uses debt financing to expand production.  
The agency problem is that each entrepreneur can spend these funds on non-productive 
managerial perquisites, receiving a proportional private benefit.  Therefore, as in the 
monopoly case, the capital market advances funds to firms in this industry only if an 
appropriate incentive compatibility constraint holds.  The constraint assures outside 
investors that the entrepreneurs have incentives to allocate financial capital to production 
rather than to perquisites.  We show that the capital-market incentive-compatibility 
constraint on symmetric entrepreneurial firms competing in a Cournot product market 
can constrain industry scale. Cournot interaction in the product markets is a very natural 
framework for our analysis of equilibrium industry capacity. Indeed, the main point of 
the paper is that because firms must acquire capacity first before engaging in production, 
they need to convince capital markets to finance these investments in capacity. The need 
for capacity commitment, is a feature that is also emphasized in the setting of Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983) who show that Bertrand competition yields Cournot outcomes .   
A symmetric oligopoly equilibrium for a financially constrained industry is 
illustrated Figure 2.  The downward-sloping line labeled ( )C iq Q−  is the standard Cournot 
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reaction curve of a representative firm.   The line labeled ˆ( )iq Q−  is the reaction firm of 
the firm with limited equity under financial constraint, and is defined implicitly by  
(1.2) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ1 (1 )iP Q q r c q r eλ− + − + + = − +   . 
The reaction curve of the firm is the minimum of the Cournot and financial 
constrained reaction curves (the darker continuous line in the graph).  This curve 
is derived by an extension of Proposition 1.  If both the firm and its investors 
expect rival firms to produce a cumulative output iQ− , then the profit-maximizing 
response of the investors is to supply sufficient financial capital to produce 
{ }1 1ˆmin ( ), ( )Cq Q q Q− − . The diagram illustrates that the capital market rations a 
representative firm if the expected cumulative output of rivals is sufficiently great.  







; in the case of duopoly, for example, this would be a 45° line.   
We now proceed to a more detailed analysis.  Oligopoly competition occurs in 
two stages.  At Stage two, the entrepreneurs play a simultaneous move game in which 
each allocates its financial capital to production or perquisites.  These production 
decisions form a Nash equilibrium.  At Stage one, the capital market supplies funds to 
each firm to earn a normal competitive return given rational expectations about the Nash 
equilibrium of the ensuing production game.  The conditions of (1) Nash equilibrium of 
the production game, and (2) zero-profits of outside investors, define an industry 
equilibrium.  In this section, we focus on a fully symmetric equilibrium. 
We adopt the following notation.  Let ne cq<  denote the financial endowment of 
a representative entrepreneur, and E ne=  the total amount of inside equity in the 
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industry.  Similarly, let K nk=  denote amount of industry debt that is raised on the 
capital market.  If financial capital is fully invested in production, then industry output is 
( )n e kQ nq
c
+
= = . 
Analysis of the production game is crucial for understanding capital market 
equilibrium.  Consider the reaction function of Firm i.  Suppose that the firm has 
borrowed ki, and expects its rival to produce a quantity of output Q-i.  The choice problem 
confronting the entrepreneur/manager of Firm i is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
,
, , (1 ) 1 ( )
i i
i i i i i i i i i i iq I
Max q e k P Q q q r I r k e k cq Iπ λ+
−
= + + + − + + + − −    
subject to     i i iI cq e k+ ≤ +          0iI ≥        0iq ≥  
where iI  is the amount of financial capital the firm holds in cash reserves. 
The similarities with the monopolist’s production problem are obvious, and 
similar arguments to the monopoly analysis yield two conclusions. First, the rational 




< ≤  if and only if this 
quantity satisfies the incentive-compatibility constraint 
( )( ; ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )i i i i i i iw q Q P Q q q r cq e k r eλ− −= + − + ≥ + − + , 
where the left-hand side is the surplus from production available to the entrepreneur and 
the right-hand side is the perquisite premium. Second, the entrepreneur never produces 
more than her Cournot best reply, i.e. ( )ci iq q Q−≤ , and may produce strictly less is 
financial capital is insufficient.  Thus, in reaction to Q-i , the firm produces the quantity  
( ; , ) min , ( )cii i i i





 if this quantity satisfies the above incentive-
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compatibility constraint, and produces 0iq =  otherwise. Because the Cournot reaction 
curve ( )ni iq Q− is non-increasing, Firm i's reaction curve at Stage 2 is a discontinuous 
function of the form 
 
( ; , ) ( , )
( ; , )
0 ( , )
i i i i i i
i i i
i i i
q Q e k if Q Q e k
q Q e k








where ( , )i iQ e k−  is defined by the binding incentive-compatibility constraint 
( )( ); ( ) (1 )i i i iw q Q Q e k r eλ− − = + − + . 
Thus, limited financial capital and the opportunity to consume perquisites modify the 
firm’s best-response curve.   It follows from these conclusions that, for an arbitrary 
subgame (defined by ik , i = 1,…n), the equilibrium production profile 
*( )iq , satisfies 
either * *( , ) ( ; , )i i i i iq e k q Q e k−= , in which case Firm i's incentive-compatibility constraint 
holds, or *( , ) 0i iq e k =  and the constraint fails.
11   
Given the capital market’s rational expectations, investors never finance a firm 
when they expect the entrepreneur to steal resources. Satisfaction of the capital market 
incentive compatibility constraint implies that there is no diversion of funds to 
perquisites, and, because investors can save on their own, we safely can restrict attention 
to equilibria in which capital markets provide funds only when they expect all the firm’s 








< , then marginal 
investors could just as well withdraw their investment in the firm.   
                                                 
11 The equilibrium of that subgame is not necessarily unique since there could exist several equilibria of the 
subgame in which one or more players produce nothing and steal all the funds. 
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In a symmetric industry equilibrium, the capital market is willing to supply funds 
to a representative firm up to the point that the firm has no incentive to steal given the 
production decisions of its rivals.  Therefore, the debt capacity of a representative firm is 
a symmetric equilibrium (with each firm producing q) is the value of k satisfying the 
binding incentive-compatibility constraint 
( )1 (1 ) (1 )e k e kP n q r c r e
c c








= .  It follows that equilibrium production of a representative firm ˆnq  in a 
symmetric industry of size n is defined exactly by the expression 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ1 (1 )n nP nq r c q r eλ − + + = − +  . 
The production of a representative firm is financed by inside equity e, and debt 
ˆ ˆnk cq e= − . 
 The capital market does not constrain product market competition when ˆn nq q≥ . 
Conversely, industry output is below the Cournot level when the capital market constraint 
binds. Note that when the capital market constraint binds, total industry output satisfies 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ1 (1 )n nP Q r c Q r Eλ − + + = − +   where ˆ ˆn nQ nq= . This shows that, when the total 
amount E of inside equity available to the industry is constant, and when the capital 
market constraint binds, the total industry output does not change with the number of 
firms.   
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Proposition 2. In a symmetric oligopoly, there is a unique 
symmetric equilibrium in which each firm produces { }ˆmin ,n nq q q= , 
financed by inside equity e and loans k cq e= − .  The constrained output 
ˆnq  is increasing in e and decreasing in λ. Furthermore, if the capital 
market constraint binds for n entrepreneurs (i.e. ˆn nq q< ), then it also 
binds for (n+1), holding the total amount of industry inside equity 
constant, and total industry output therefore does not change with an 
increase in the number of firms. 
 
It is remarkable that the industry scale can be invariant to market concentration.  
While the standard Cournot industry output strictly increases in the number of active 
firms (Amir and Lambson, 2000), the financially-constrained industry output does not 
depend on n.  That is, if ˆMQ Q> , then n MQ Q> , and industry scale is invariant to 
market concentration in a symmetric equilibrium (keeping total inside equity E constant 
and adjusting each individual firm’s inside equity to the level Ee
n
= ).  When industry 
output is not constrained by the agency problem confronting entrepreneurs and outside 
investors, each firm produces the symmetric Cournot output, and an increase the number 
of firms expands the scale of the industry. 
 Note that capital market constraint necessarily binds as the industry becomes less 
concentrated holding industry inside equity constant.  The perfectly competitive output 
level *Q  satisfies  
 *( ) (1 )P Q r c= + . 
  21
While the Cournot output converges to *Q  as n →∞ , the equilibrium output of a 
financially-constrained industry remains at a scale *Qˆ Q< . 
Similarly to the monopoly model, an increase in the amount of inside equity 
supplied by entrepreneurs might expand industry scale.  New entry expands the market 
only to the extent that the new entrant contributes additional inside equity to the industry.  
New entrants that rely more heavily on debt than inside equity exert less competitive 
pressure on the product market.   
Also as in the monopoly model, an improvement in industry-wide corporate 
governance improves social welfare by expanding the market.  We have argued that 
agency problems can cause credit markets to limit the scale of an industry.  An interesting 
corollary of this general point is that private parties should not be expected to invest 
optimally in corporate governance.  The benefits of market expansion accrue partly to 
consumer welfare that would not be internalized by entrepreneurs when organizing their 
firms.  From this perspective, a public policy toward corporate governance could be as 
important as antitrust policy for increasing social welfare. 
We now illustrate our analysis of symmetric oligopoly with the linear demand 
example from above. When the demand function is linear, the standard Cournot output is 
given by (1 )
1





. This equilibrium can be supported only if each entrepreneur’s 
inside equity satisfies the condition 
( )
2
1 ( 1) [ (1 ) ]
(1 )( 1)
n A r n c A r ce e
r n
λ + − + + + − +  ≥ = − 
+ +  
. 




− + +≤ ) the 
unique and symmetric Cournot equilibrium can be supported with zero inside equity. As 
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in the monopoly case this is possible only if parameters are such that (1 )A r cλ≥ + + . 
Furthermore,  when  [ ]2 (1 ) 1A r cn
cλ
− +




 However, when inside equity is low enough (that is ne e< ), the unique 
equilibrium output is ( ) ( )( )21ˆ 1 [ 1 ] 4 (1 )2nq A r c A r c n r en λ λ= − + + + − + + + + . Note 
















.  Replacing ne by E in the expression for ˆnq , it is 
clear that the expression ˆnnq  is independent of n when E is constant. 
In order to illustrate the effect of capital market constraints on the outcome of 
product market competition, consider the case of splitting a constrained monopolist into 
two identical firms. According to the above analysis, a monopolist is constrained if 
parameters are such that 
( ) ( )1 2 1
4(1 )
M A r c A r cE E
r
λ + − + + − +      < = − 
+  
and 
( ) ( )1 1 2r c A r cλ+ ≤ < + + . Suppose that the monopoly firm is split into two identical 
firms each with equity 
2
Ee = . This split changes total equilibrium output from the 
constrained monopoly level ( ) ( )( )21ˆ 1 [ 1 ] 4(1 )2MQ A r c A r c r Eλ λ= − + + + − + + + +  to 
the constrained duopoly output 
( ) ( )( )21ˆ ˆ2 1 [ 1 ] 4(1 )2D DQ q A r c A r c r Eλ λ= = − + + + − + + + + , that is total output does 
not change at all. 
We close this section by comparing our analysis of symmetric oligopoly with 
Brander and Lewis (1986).  Brander and Lewis identified the “limited liability effect” of 
  23
debt, namely, that increased debt encourages managers to expand production in order to 
increase profits in high-demand and low-cost states of the world in which the firm 
remains solvent.  No such effect appears in our model.  There are several differences 
between our model of symmetric oligopoly and the Brander-Lewis model explaining this.  
First, and most importantly, managers have the option of spending working capital on 
perquisites.  Secondly, the firm is equity-constrained, i.e. entrepreneurs contribute a 
limited amount of financial capital, and there is no role for outside equity.  Third, and 
least importantly, there is no product market uncertainty.  Product market uncertainty is 
key ingredient of the Brander-Lewis limited liability effect, but it is not a sufficient 
ingredient.  Nothing important would change if we were to introduce product market 
uncertainty into our model of a capital-constrained industry.  The capital market would 
still ration firms in order to prevent the misappropriation of working capital, and the firm 
would be unable to expand production because of its financial constraints.  The only 
difference is that firms’ output level would be constrained below the Brander-Lewis 
equilibrium level rather than the Cournot level.  Thus, if our model were extended to 
product market uncertainty, the limited liability effect would reappear under certain 
conditions even in a capital-constrained industry.  If the capital-market constraint were 
slack, however, then the limited liability effect identified by Brander and Lewis (1988) 
would determine the equilibrium level of output..  In this way our model lays the 
groundwork for a more general framework with richer empirical predictions. 
 
5. Asymmetric equity 
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We now allow that the otherwise symmetric entrepreneurs supply different 
amounts of equity capital. We show that industry scale still depends on the total amount 
of inside equity of constrained firms, and when all firms are constrained, a firm’s share of 
the product market is equal to its share of industry inside equity.   
Suppose Firm i has equity capital cie cq< , has borrowed ki, and expects its rivals 
to produce a cumulative quantity Q-i. A similar analysis to the symmetric case allows us 
to conclude that the firm’s best response is a discontinuous function: the entrepreneur 
produces ( ; , ) ( , , )i i i i i i i iq Q e k q Q e k− −=  if and only if i iQ Q− −≤  (where iQ−  is defined by 
( )( ); ( ) (1 )i i i i i iW q Q Q e k r eλ− − = + − +  as in the symmetric case) and nothing otherwise. 
The capital market anticipates these incentives and advances funds to each firm 
up the point at which the incentive-compatibility constraint binds, that is  
( )(1 ) 1i i i ii ie k e kP Q r c r ec cλ−
 +  + 
+ − + + = − +  
 
 
. Given the investors’ rational 
expectations and their ability to invest on their own at rate r, we can restrict our attention 






= .  It is straightforward to verify that in equilibrium there can be only two types 
of firms. One subset of firms are constrained by agency problems and therefore are not 
producing the Cournot best response to their competitors’ output; i.e. their output is 
characterized by ( , ) ( )ni i i i iq e k q Q−<  and ( ) ( )(1 ) 1i i i iP Q q r c q r eλ− + − + + = − +   . The 
other set of firms are unconstrained by the capital market and are on their Cournot best 
response curves; i.e. ( ; , ) ( )ni i i i i iq Q e k q Q− −=  and 
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( )(1 ) 1i i i ii ie k e kP Q r c r ec cλ−
 +  + 
+ − + + ≥ − +  
 
 
. Equilibrium is described by the 
following proposition.  
 
Proposition 3.  With an asymmetric allocation of inside equity, 
equilibrium is essentially unique12 and can be characterized as follows. 
Some firms are unconstrained and produce the Cournot best response to 
their competitors’ output while others are constrained and produce less 
than their best response. Furthermore, all unconstrained firms produce 
the same quantity of output and have higher levels of equity and output 
than the constrained firms.  The debt and output levels of the constrained 
firms are proportional to the amount of their contributions of inside 
equity.  Finally, splitting a constrained firm into smaller firms does not 
change total industry output.  
 
Naturally, the unconstrained firms are those with more equity.  These firms are on 
their Cournot best response curves, and it is no matter whether they finance production 
with debt or equity as long as their capital market constraints remain slack (Modigliani 
and Miller (1958)).  Among the subset of constrained firms, those with more equity are 
able to borrow more and have a larger market share. All constrained firms are equally 
leveraged (i.e. have the same debt-equity ratio), while unconstrained firms are less 
leveraged than their constrained competitors. 
                                                 
12  Equilibrium outputs of all firms and the capital structure of constrained firms is unique.  As discussed 
below, there is an inconsequential indeterminancy in the capital structure of unconstrained firm. 
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Increasing the amount of equity financing of an unconstrained firm has no effect 
on equilibrium output. However, this is not true for constrained firms and an increase in 
the equity of these firms does increase output. Similarly, splitting a constrained firm into 
separate firms does not change the total level of output; the output of the original firm is 
just split between the spin-offs proportionally to the split of equity. In contrast, splitting 
an unconstrained firm or reallocating equity from constrained to unconstrained firms can 
affect equilibrium output.  
It is interesting to consider the bilateral incentives to merger in our model.  If a 
credit-constrained firm acquires a competitor, and finances the acquisition with debt, then 
industry output decreases and the product price rises to the extent that the merger reduces 
industry inside equity.  This capital market response to a horizontal merger is not 
discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines published by the U.S. Department of 
Justice.  Such a consideration also is absent from Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds’ (1983) 
classic analysis of bilateral merger incentives for the standard Cournot model.   A 
bilateral merger might be profitable in our model, when it is not profitable in the standard 
model, if capital market constraints reduce the ability of rival firms to expand in response 
to an increase in product price. 
We close this section by relating our results to some relevant empirical literature.  
Various empirical studies establish a link between product market behavior and financial 
conditions.  For instance, Chevalier (1995a) documents that the leveraged 
recapitalizations of supermarkets have a positive effect on the stock returns of competing 
firms.  Chevalier (1995a), Phillips (1995) and Kovenock and Phillips (1997) show that 
firms that increase leverage tend to reduce capacity while their rivals are likely to expand.  
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These empirical regularities are sometimes interpreted as indicating a softening of 
competition that contradicts the limited liability effect of debt on output strategy.  In 
contrast, out theory supports a negative relationship between leverage and output.  In our 
model, the amount of inside equity constrains a firm’s borrowing capacity, and more 
leveraged firms are less able to attract further outside finance in order to expand 
production.  To the extent that leveraged buy-outs and similar recapitalizations exhaust a 
firm’s debt capacity, our model predicts that these transactions would tend to decrease a 
firm’s output.  This creates an opportunity for firms with more financial slack to expand 




 Although it is widely recognized that agency problems between investors and 
controlling insiders are a major impediment to the financing of firms, the impact of these 
problems on the outcome of the product market is not well understood. This paper has 
argued that in some circumstances, capital market constraints may be more important for 
consumer welfare than product market structure. In particular, when moral hazard 
pervades the relationship between investors and firms, increased competition may not 
result in the expected expansion in output and reduction in prices, unless it is 
accompanied by an increase in industry inside equity.  
 A recognition that the firms in an industry compete in both product and capital 
markets has potentially important public policy implications. Our analysis suggests that 
antitrust regulation should include the financial conditions of firms in the analysis of the 
competitive impact of mergers and splits. Similarly, policies that heighten competitive 
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pressure in an industry, such as trade liberalization, could exacerbate the insiders’ 
incentive to loot the firm. As a consequence, the flexibility of local corporate governance 
arrangements can affect the successful implementation of these policies. 
 An interesting extension of the model is to allow firms to choose governance-
related variables. Indeed, in the medium and long run, corporate governance 
arrangements (as well as the legal structure) can and do change with the firm’s 
environment. Tighter corporate governance schemes that decrease the insiders’ 
discretionary power or increase outsiders’ monitoring ability make stealing less 
attractive; however, because of their very intrusiveness, they may come at the cost of 
lower productivity of insiders. In other words more intrusive governance schemes may 
decrease the insiders’ marginal benefit of stealing and at the same time adversely impact 
the firm’s cost structure. Changes in the competitive environment are likely to affect the 
firm’s perception of this trade-off. The analysis of these more complex interactions is left 
for further research. 




A1: Optimality of simple debt contracts  
Debt contracts can be used to achieve any out come that can be achieved with other 
feasible contracts. To see why, let (S(R),K) represent a contract that specifies the 
investors return S(R) as a function of revenue R(Q), and the level of outside financing K. 
Define: 
( , ) ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q
W S K Max W S K Q R Q S R E K cQλ= = − + + −  
  s.t. ( )S R R≤        E KQ
c
+≤  
The first constraint represents the entrepreneur’s limited liability and the fact that private 
benefits can never be recovered, and the second constraint is the budget constraint. Let 
Q* be the solution to that problem. The contract S(R) is feasible if ( )( *) (1 )S R Q K r≥ + , 





Max W S K  
                                                  s.t. ( )( *) (1 )S R Q K r≥ + . 
For any optimal contract (S(R),K), the debt contract ( )( )min (1 ), ( ) ,K r R Q K+  yields the 
same outcome. To see why, if Q* is the outcome under contract (S(R),K) then we must 
have ( ) ( )* * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R Q S R Q cQ R Q S R Q cQλ λ− − ≥ − −  for all E KQ c
+≤ . Since 
contract ( ( ), )S R K  is feasible, we have  
 ( ) ( )* * * * * *( ) min ( ), (1 ) ( ) ( )R Q R Q K r cQ R Q S R Q cQλ λ− + − ≥ − − . 
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Since ( ( ), )S R K  is optimal, any contract ( '( ), )S R K  such that '( ) ( )S R S R=  for R R′≠  
and '( ) min{ ( ), (1 )}S R S R K r′ ′= +  for some R′  that corresponds to output E KQ
c
+
′ ≤ , is 
also optimal and yields output *Q ; otherwise ( )S R cannot be optimal. As a consequence: 
( ) ( )* * * * * *( ) min ( ), (1 ) ( ) ( )R Q R Q K r cQ R Q S R Q cQλ λ− + − ≥ − −  
                                            ( )( )( ) min ( ) , (1 )R Q S R Q K r cQλ′ ′ ′≥ − + − . 
 
Since ( )( ) ( )S R Q R Q′ ′≤  we have  
( ) ( )( )* * *( ) min ( ), (1 ) ( ) min ( ) , (1 )R Q R Q K r cQ R Q S R Q K r cQλ λ′ ′ ′− + − ≥ − + −  
                                    ( )( ) min ( ), (1 )R Q R Q K r cQλ′ ′ ′≥ − + − .                                                      
 
This simply says that *Q  is the output associated with the proposed debt contract. 
 
A2: Efficient Stealing   
Suppose that stealing is not always wasteful, (i.e.  1 rλ > + ). This occurs when the 
entrepreneur values the private benefits more than the cash that is necessary to generate 
these benefits. In this case even a self-financed monopolist would invest in private 
benefits. 
In any case, a debt-financed entrepreneur will never produce more than Q  defined as: 
( )R Q cλ′ =  since beyond that point the marginal revenue from production is lower than 
the benefit from stealing the additional funds expended in the production of the extra 
units. Note that because 1 rλ > +  and R(Q) is concave we must have MQ Q≤ . 
Define K  as ( ) (1 ) ( )R Q K r E Kλ− + = +   . 
K  is the maximum principal amount of a loan that the entrepreneur can be expected to 
repay while producing the quantity Q . However, Q  can be produced with a loan K  only 
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if E K cQ+ ≥  . Recall that Qˆ  is the maximum capacity that the capital market will 
finance when the entrepreneur contributes an amount E. If  Qˆ Q≤   then capital markets 
are not willing to finance Q  and the equilibrium is similar to the constrained equilibrium 
described in Proposition 1 with ˆQ Q=  , ˆK cQ E= −  and no stealing. When parameters 
are such that Qˆ Q>   then E K cQ+ >   and in equilibrium Q Q=  , K K=   and the 
entrepreneur steals ( )E K cQ+ −  . 
This result is essentially the same as Proposition 1, except that the unconstrained 
monopolist enjoys private benefits. 
 
A3:  Relationship with Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) set forth a graphical analysis of an owner-manager’s 
choice between perquisites and value maximization.  The choice is determined by a 
tangency between a “budget constraint” and a set of indifference curves, as illustrated in 
Figure 3(a). The vertical axis measures the market value of the firm (V).  The horizontal 
measures the market value of perquisites, i.e. loss of market value resulting from the 
consumption of managerial perquisites (F).  The budget line has a slope of –1.  It hits the 
horizontal access when the value of the firm is zero.  Convex indifference curves in (V,F) 
space represent the managers preferences between creating value and consuming 
perquisites.  An owner-manager makes an efficient choice at a point of tangency between 
an indifference curve and the budget line.  An increase in scale up to the monopoly level 
shifts out the budget line.  
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We now interpret our monopoly model with a similar graphical analysis.  
Consider a firm with financial capital E+K.  Assume that the firm is debt-financed as 
described above.  The market value of the firm and the market value of perquisites 
depend on the scale of operation chosen by the entrepreneur.  Ignoring bankruptcy, the 






.   The entrepreneur’s consumption of 
managerial perquisites is ( )Z E K cQλ= + − .  Combining these two conditions to 
eliminate Q gives 1
(1 )
E K ZV R K
r c cλ
+ 
= − − +  
.   
The value of the firm when perquisites are zero is 1
(1 )
E KV R K
r c
+ 
= − +  
.  
Therefore, continuing to ignore bankruptcy, 
1
(1 )
E K Z E KV V R R
r c c cλ
 + +    
= + − −    +  
  
 
.   The market value of perquisites Z is 
1
(1 )
E K E K ZF R R
r c c cλ
 + +    
= − −    +  
  
 
.  Therefore, we have the relationship 
V V F= −  corresponding to the downward-sloping “budget constraint” in Jensen and 
Meckling’s diagram. 
The indifference curves for the entrepreneur are constructed as follows.  Since the 
revenue function R(Q) is concave,  F is an increasing, convex function of Z.  Inverting 
this relationship expresses the consumption of managerial perquisites as a increasing, 












.  Thus, the entrepreneur has downward-
sloping, convex indifference curves in ( ),V F  space. 
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.  Note 









.  Therefore the slope of the indifference curve at 










.  Consequently, 0F =  is optimal for the entrepreneur if and only 
if ' E KR c
c
λ+  ≥ 
 
, which is to say that discounted marginal revenue exceeds the 
marginal value of perquisities.   
Recall that '( )1
MR Q cr =+  at the neoclassical monopoly solution.  Therefore, if 
there were no possibility of bankruptcy, there would be no agency costs of debt, and the 
neoclassical monopoly outcome would be feasible, (assuming 0 < λ < 1+r.)   This case is 
illustrated in Figure 3(a). 
Bankruptcy is accounted for as follows.  When bankruptcy is possible the value of 
the firm is  
{ }( ) 1max ,0 min , min ,
1 1
R Q E K E K ZV K V R R V V F V
r r c c cλ
  + +      
= − = − − − = −    
  
 + +       
.   
Once the market value of the firm is driven to zero, any further consumption of 
perquisites does not reduce the market value of the firm, because the loss is shifted to 
debt-holders.  Therefore, the “budget constraint” in ( ),V F  space is piecewise linear, as 
illustrated in Figure 3(b) and (c).  It is downward-sloping with a unit slope in the positive 
orthant, and becomes flat once it hits the horizontal axis.   
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This non-convex budget constraint allows for two local maxima of the 











Thus, the entrepreneur either devotes all financial capital of the firm to production, or 
consumes it all in managerial perquisites and declares bankruptcy.  The first possibility is 
the global maximum when K is sufficiently small.  The second possibility is the global 
maximum as K approaches the neoclassical monopoly scale, under the condition of the 
Proposition.  The solution ˆK cQ E= −  is the scale at which the two local maxima have 
the same value.    
 
A4:  Proof of Proposition 2 
Clearly, the standard Cournot equilibrium can be supported as long as 















Suppose that this is case and assume that there is another equilibrium. In this equilibrium 
all firms can obviously not be constrained by the market, that is we cannot have 
( )ci i iq q Q−= for all firms since the symmetric equilibrium is unique. Similarly all firms 
cannot be constrained by the capital market, that is ( )ci i iq q Q−< for all i since then we 
would have 
( ) ( )1 (1 )P Q r c Q r Eλ− + + = − +    and ( ) ( )1 (1 )iP Q r c q r eλ− + + = − +    for all i 
which, given the inequality ( ) ( )1 (1 )n nP nq r c q r eλ − + + ≥ − +   would imply 
n
iq q q= > for all i. This of course cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, we must have 
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( )ni i iq q Q−< , ( )1iP q P r c′ + > + and ( ) ( )1 (1 )iP Q r c q r eλ− + + = − +    for some i, and 
( )nj j jq q Q−= , ( )1jP q P r c′ + = + and ( ) ( )1 (1 )jP Q r c q r eλ− + + ≥ − +   for some j. 
Comparing the incentive-compatibility expressions yields j iq q≤  while comparing the 
Cournot first-order conditions yields j iq q> , an obvious contradiction. 
Now assume that the unique and symmetric Cournot equilibrium cannot be supported by 
the amount of inside equity., that is ( ) ( )1 (1 )n nP nq r c q r eλ − + + < − +  . A similar 
argument to the one above shows that we must have ˆniq q=  for all i..  
Finally note that if the total level of inside equity cannot support the unconstrained 
equilibrium for n entrepreneurs, it cannot do so for (n+1) entrepreneurs either. To see 
why, if the uncontrained equilibrium cannot be supported with n entrepreneurs, we have 
( ) ( )1 (1 )n nP nq r c q r eλ − + + < − +   and summing across firms 
 ( ) ( )1 (1 )n nP Q r c Q r Eλ − + + < − +  . 
 Therefore, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 (1 )n n n n n nQ Q P Q r c Q P Q r c Q r Eλ λ+    ≥ ⇒ − + + ≤ − + + < − +     
which implies that the unconstrained equilibrium cannot be supported with this level of 
inside equity either.■ 
 
A5:  Dynamics of Monopoly  
We analyze how a longer horizon can relax the credit market incentive-
compatibility constraint that limits industry scale in a one-period market.  We develop the 
analysis for the case of a monopoly similar to the one before, except that the market 
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remains open for two periods.  We demonstrate conditions under which the neoclassical 
monopoly output obtains in the two-period model but not the one-period model, and 
conversely. 
Output is produced at two dates: { }1, 2t∈ .  In each period, demand is the same as 
before.  All inputs are variable, and must be purchased in advance of production in each 
period.  The production technology is constant returns as before and the interest rate is 
constant over time. 
We allow for long-term loan contracts, although these do not play a significant role in our 
analysis.  At the beginning of period t, the capital market advances tK , and, at the end of 
the period, the firm repays ( )1 tr K+ .  From an outside investor’s perspective a long term 
loan contract is equivalent to a sequence of short-term contracts.13 
The market unfolds as follows.  At the beginning of period 1, the entrepreneur 
invests financial capital 1E E= , as in the one-period model.  The capital market supplies 




= .   At the beginning of period 2, 






= .  The entrepreneur’s payoff at the end of the second period is 
                                                 
13 We assume that entrepreneur is free to arrange credit on any terms satisfying this 
condition and the additional incentive compatibility conditions introduced below.   A 
standard long-term loan contract advances funds in stages.  An outside investor lends 1 
dollar in period 1 and another 2
1
Kk K=  dollars in period 2.  The firm repays ( )1 r+  at 
the end of period 1 and another ( )1 r k+  at the end of period 2.  This staged-finance 
contract is analogous to that analyzed by Bolton and Scharfstein (19xx), who make 
different assumptions about contractibility.  Indeed, they consider the opposite case in 
which investment funds are contractible but sales revenues are not.   
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( ) ( )2 2 21R Q r Kπ = − + .  There is no payoff at the end of the first-period, because profits 
are fully reinvested assuming 2 0K > . 
Capital market incentive-compatibility constraints assure outside investors that 
the entrepreneur has no incentive to spend on managerial perquisites.  The second-period 
constraint is  
 2 2cQπ λ≥ . 
The first-period constraint is  






where π  is the second-period expected profit an entrepreneur who defaults in the first 
period. 
 The value of π  depends whether the entrepreneur’s monopoly property right is 
protected in bankruptcy.  We assume so.14 More precisely we assume that an 
entrepreneur who defaults cannot be prevented from starting a new firm but that funds 
that are converted into private benefits cannot be used as equity. Let 0Qˆ  be the strictly 
positive root of 0 0ˆ ˆ( ) (1 ) 0R Q r cQλ− + + = , and assume 0ˆ MQ Q< .  Then an entrepreneur 
with zero equity at the beginning of the second-period produces 0Qˆ  with borrowed funds, 
and earns an end-of-period profit 0ˆcQπ λ= .  Therefore, the first-period incentive 








≥ +  + + 
. 
                                                 
14 The exact solution of the dynamic game obviously depends upon the entrepreneur’s outside option; 
however, the qualitative insights are robust. 
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Suppose that the two incentive compatibility constraints are slack.  It is 
straightforward to prove that optimal credit market arrangements allow the neoclassical 
monopoly output MQ  in both periods.  At the neoclassical solution, the entrepreneur 
earns  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22 1 2 1M Mr E r R Q r cQπ  = + + + − +  . 
All of the entrepreneur’s return comes at the end of the second period, and consists of a 
normal return on inside equity plus compounded monopoly rents.  At the neoclassical 
solution, the first-period incentive constraint implies the second-period constraint.  
Therefore, both constraints are indeed satisfied if 





M M MQc rE Q P Q r c Q
r r r
λ   +  ≥ + − − +    + + + 
.  
How does this industry outcome contrast with the one period model?  In the one 
period model, an entrepreneur with equity E is constrained by the credit market if 
ˆ MQ Q< .  This condition is equivalent to  
 
( ) ( )1
1
M MP Q r c Q
E
r
λ − + + < −
+
. 
Therefore, we have the following result. 
Proposition 4  If  
 
( ) ( ) ( )







P Q r c QQc rQ P Q r c Q E
r r rr
λλ  − + +  +   + − − + ≤ < −    + + ++ 
 
then 1 2
MQ Q Q= =  in the two-period model, while MQ Q<  in the one-
period model . 
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Thus there exist a range of circumstances when the capital market constrains 
industry scale in the one-period monopoly model, but not in the two-period model.  The 
conditions defining these circumstances are nondegenerate if   
 ( ) ( ) ( )







P Q r c QQc rQ P Q r c Q
r r rr
λλ  − + +  +   + − − + < −    + + ++ 
. 
  A few simple algebraic manipulations reduce this inequality to 
 ( ) ( ) 0ˆ1M MR Q r cQ cQλ− + > , 
which must hold given the definition of 0Qˆ  and 
MQ (i.e. the very definition of these 
variables yields  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1M MR Q r cQ R Q r cQ cQλ− + > − + = ). 
 
A6:   Proof of Proposition 3 
Define ˆ( , )iq Q e  and ( )q Q  respectively by the equations 
( ) ( ) ˆ1 ( , ) (1 )i iP Q r c q Q e r eλ− + + = − +    and ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1P Q q Q P Q r c′ + = + . If Q is the 
total equilibrium output, then each firm’s output is described by 
{ }ˆ( ) min ( , ), ( )i iq Q q Q e q Q= . It is easy to verify that both ˆ( , )iq Q e  and ( )q Q are 
decreasing functions of Q. As a consequence ( )iq Q is also decreasing in Q and the fixed 
point ( )i
i
Q q Q=∑  is unique which implies that any equilibrium is also unique. 
Suppose that firm i is constrained then  ( ) ( )(1 ) 1i iP Q r c q r eλ− + + = − +    and 
( )ni i iq q Q−< . The last inequality implies ( ) ( ) ( )1iP Q q P Q r c′ + > + . If firm j is not 
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constrained then ( ) ( )(1 ) 1j jP Q r c q r eλ− + + ≥ − +   and ( )nj j jq q Q−=  which implies 
( ) ( ) ( )1jP Q q P Q r c′ + = + . Given the model’s assumptions, and the fact that in 
equilibrium all funds are used for production:  
a) the first order conditions above clearly imply i jq q<  and i i j je k e k+ < + ; 
b) the two incentive compatibility constraints imply 




P r c e














which clearly implies ji
i i j j
ee
e k e k
≤
+ +
. This inequality implies that if i je e>  then i jk k> . 
Since we have i i j je k e k+ < +  we can therefore not have i je e> . Therefore unconstrained 
firms have more equity than constrained firms. 
If firms i and j are both constrained it is straightforward that ji
i i j j
ee
e k e k
=
+ +
 and that  
i j i j i je e k k q q< ⇒ < ⇒ < . Finally it is obvious that when a constrained firm i is split 







=∑ , in the new equilibrium the output of the original firm is 





=  since 
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The entrepreneur’s choice between production and perquisites: 
(a) Jensen and Meckling (1976) 










Figure 3 (c) 
The entrepreneur’s choice between production and perquisites: 
The constrained entrepreneur 
